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Today is a time of "insider trading"' and a time of concern about "insider
trading." ' 2 For the "insider trader," 3 such as Gordon Gekko, 4 today is perhaps not
the best of times, but certainly in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella5
and Dirks,6 it is the better of times. For the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission") and those investors who trade without knowledge of so-called
"inside information," 7 today is perhaps not the worst of times, but a worse time, at
least with respect to a possible remedy under the federal securities laws. 8
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1. A flurry of insider trading articles has appeared in the literature. For example, from August 20, 1986, to August
20, 1987, the Wall Street Journal published over 340 articles on that subject.
2. The most recent vacancy in the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") resulted in
President Reagan's appointing Professor David Ruder, an outspoken opponent of insider trading. Ingersoll & Seib, SEC's
Drive Against Insider Trading To Be Pressed by Ruder, Reagan Vows, Wall St. J., June 18, 1987, at 3, col. 2.
Congressional concern about insider trading is found in its most recently enacted law on the subject. Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78c, 78o, 78t,
78u, and 78ff). For discussion of the Act, see Comment, Inside Information and Outside Traders: Corporate Recovery
of the Outsider's Unfair Gain, 73 CAL. L. Rav. 483 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Inside Information and Outside
Traders]; and Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading SanctionsAct of1984, 71 VA. L. REv. 455 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act]. Section 21(d)(2)(A) gives the Commission authority to seek treble
damages in certain situations; the recovered funds are paid to the U.S. Treasury. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). See generally Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND.
L. REv. 1273 (1984); Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, 1985 DtrKE L.J. 960; Note, Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their Relation to Substantive Law: Ramifications of
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 20 VAL. U.L. REv. 575 (1986).
3. For the purpose of this Article, an "insider trader" is any person who buys or sells securities with knowledge
of material nonpublic information but who does not disclose that information. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying
text.
4. Gordon Gekko is the fictional villain in the popular movie "Wall Street." While he is an insider trader under
the definition of this Article, he may not be liable for some of his trading given the recent Supreme Court decisions
because he may have had in some cases no duty to disclose. See infra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
5. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For discussion of this case, see infra notes 119-34 and
accompanying text.
6. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). For discussion of this case, see infra notes 135-41 and accompanying
text.
7. For the purposes of this Article, "inside information" is defined as any kind of information not available to
the public.
8. The federal securities laws, especially § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),
provide remedies for some types of insider trading. The Commission has taken the view that insider trading by a select
group of individuals with nonpublic information destroys the integrity of the markets and has utilized rule lOb-5 to
regulate people who trade on such confidential inside information. See generally Barry, The Economics of Outside
Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. Rav. 1307 (1981); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 1-ARv. L. REv. 322 (1979); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983).
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Yet today is in another sense a different time with respect to "insider trading."
In Chiarella and in Dirks the Supreme Court tied liability under section 10(b)9 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")1o and rule lOb-51i to some
duty to disclose or refrain from trading or tipping. 12 That duty, at least in the case of
traditional insiders,1 3 and perhaps their tippees,14 lies in the comihon law; and, given
the realities of today's world of corporations, it lies largely in the law of Delaware
and a few other key commercial states. 1 5
Accordingly, this Article will examine the common law regulation of "insider
trading," the beginnings, the period of evolution, the period of unfortunate de facto
federal preemption, and finally the present period of necessary and appropriate re-
surgence. The future regulation of "insider trading," absent some rather substantial
legislation from Congress, 1 6 lies to a great extent in the further judicial development
of the common law of fiduciary duty owed by directors, officers, key employees, and
perhaps some others to their corporations. The evolution began, it was interrupted, but
it is today again "on the move." State law regulation of the problem is inevitable.17
More important, the duty of "insiders" with respect to disclosure is presently an
expanding duty.' 8 Indeed, the trend of state court decisions, particularly those of the
Delaware Supreme Court, on the scope of fiduciary duties, including the duty not to
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
11. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
12. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
13. For the purposes of this Article, traditional insiders are directors, officers, and key employees. See generally
Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (a confidential secretary to an officer and director was
liable for a breach of his fiduciary obligation to the corporation when he traded without disclosing confidential
information).
14. A "tippee" is one who receives nonpublic inside information from a tipper. The "tipper," of course, is the
person, who by the nature of his position, possesses material inside information and who selectively discloses it. Although
liability has been extended to tippees, liability is limited, and requires the tippee to know or have reason to know of the
tipper's breach. See generally 5 A. JACOBs, LrrloArTON AND PRAcncE UNDER RuLE 10b-5 § 6 (1987).
15. An examination of those companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange reveals that a substantial minority
(approximately 46%) of the corporations are incorporated in Delaware. 1 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCI) 725-801 (1987).
Additionally, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, California, Texas, and Ohio have a notable number of businesses
incorporated in their states as well. Id. For this reason, Delaware court decisions, and court decisions from the other
above-mentioned states, have a profound effect on the development of the corporate law, both judicial and statutory.
16. The Commission has included a proposed legislative definition of insider trading in one of its latest attempts
to amend the Exchange Act. The submitted proposal now being reviewed by the Senate Banking Subcommittee on
Securities is known as the Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987. See Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory:
Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 373 (1988).
17. See generally Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the Common Law, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
845 (1982). Professor Hazen contends that the state's role was to fill the gaps in the federal regulation of insider trading.
Id. at 847. Professor Hazen's point is well taken; however, it is the contention of this author that later case development
since 1982 (i.e., Dirks) has not only reawakened the common law, but will result in state common law surpassing the
federal law as the primary means of attacking insider trading.
18. This duty is particularly significant in recent Delaware cases. See infra notes 167-80 and accompanying text.
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trade without complete and correct disclosure, suggests that state common law will
now provide the most appropriate and effective regulation of "insider trading."
II. THE MEANING OF "INSIDER TRADING"
The extent to which "insider trading" is or should be regulated has been the
subject of endless commentary. 19 Any meaningful consideration of that issue,
however, presumes some understanding of what activities constitute "insider
trading." Although the term has become almost a household word, its meaning is in
fact elusive, even confusing, rather than precise.
While the meaning of trading is crystal clear, including both the purchasing and
selling of securities, 20 normally through a broker-dealer 2i over an exchange or
over-the-counter, the significance of the term "insider" or "inside" is otherwise. In
reality that adjective is sometimes used to describe the undisclosed information
involved. In other words, nonpublic information is frequently referred to as "inside
information." Presumably, then, "insider trading" could mean any trading by any
person who happens to be aware of and fails to disclose such nonpublic information
either about the issuer of the securities involved or about the market. Alternatively,
the phrase "insider trading" could mean trading on the basis of such nonpublic
19. For articles in favor of the prohibition of insider trading, see generally Brudney, supra note 8; Conant, Duties
of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CoaRNE. L.Q. 53 (1960); Cox, Insider Trading and
Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628; Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading
Restrictions, 66 VA. L. Rav. 1 (1980). For commentaries criticizing the prohibition of insider trading, see generally H.
MArNE, INsmER TRADING AND Tim STocK MARKErs (1966); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 8; Note, The Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977).
20. Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act defines a security as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit,
for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall
not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time
of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). It should be noted that the definition of security, despite its seemingly extensive definition
in the Exchange Act, has been "elusive." See generally Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a Security, 14 REv. SEc.
REo. 981 (1981), and its updates, Schneider, Developments in Defining a "Security," 16 Rv. SEc. REG. 985 (1983), and
Schneider, Definition of a "Security"-198311984 Update, 17 Rav. SEC. REG. 851 (1984), for summaries of the
elusiveness of the definition of the term "security" under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and the
Exchange Act.
21. "Broker" is defined as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others, but does not include a bank." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)
(1982). "Dealer" is defined as:
[A]ny person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or
otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account,
either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business.
Id. § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1982). For the purposes of this Article, the dichotomy between broker and dealer
is irrelevant; thus the general term broker-dealer will be used throughout.
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information if, but only if, the trader is an "insider" 22 within the meaning of the
applicable regulations.
Although consideration of the provisions of the federal regulatory scheme that
relate to trading in reliance upon information not publicly available would provide a
basis for either definition of "insider trading," 23 this Article will regard "insider
trading" as any trading by any person who is aware of, but fails to publicly disclose,
nonpublic information that is material to the transaction. 24 In terms of the federal
regulatory scheme, this broader definition is more consistent with the primary
purpose of the securities laws, that is to protect investors by requiring, encouraging,
or otherwise facilitating the maximum amount of timely disclosure of all material
information.25 It is also more consistent with the language of section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, the primary bases for federal regulation of "insider
trading," since they purport to apply to "any person" rather than to any specific
category or categories of persons. 26
II. THE REGULATORY PROBLEMS
The regulation of insider trading, to the extent that it has been or is presently
regulated, stems from several sources, both federal and state, of both statutory and
common law origins. For the last two decades, 27 the Exchange Act's general
antifraud provision contained in section 10(b) and its enabling rule lOb-5 have been
the source of virtually all enforcement actions against persons trading on nonpublic
information, actions brought often by the Commission, 28 but perhaps more often by
22. Such a definition is supplied in § 16 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982). This section applies to
officers and directors of issuers having a class of equity securities registered pursuant to § 12 of the Exchange Act and
to beneficial owners of more than 10% of any class of registered equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982). Under
§ 16(b), the corporation or a shareholder, on behalf of the corporation, may recover profits gained by such insiders
regardless of whether they traded the corporation's securities on the basis of inside information. Section 16 applies to any
purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, within a six-month period, regardless of intent. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
23. In enacting § 16 of the Exchange Act, Congress intended to prevent traditional corporate insiders from trading
on inside information. See generally Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). This
section, however, does not include everyone who may have a fiduciary duty to the corporation; thus, the reach of the
section is limited.
24. See generally TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). An omitted fact is material under rule
14a-9 of the Exchange Act,17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1987), "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449. Although TSC addresses materiality under
§ 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the test for materiality is the same under all securities statutes. Alton Box Bd. Co. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1977). For cases applying the TSC definition of materiality to
§ 10(b) actions, see Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 176 n.17 (8th Cir. 1982); Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land
Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. (1933), reprinted in 2
LGisLArsv lsroRY OF THE SEcutrims Acr OF 1933 AND SEcutrrms ExCHANGE Acr OF 1934 item 17 (comp. by J.S.
Ellenberger & E. Mahar 1973).
26. See supra note 11.
27. Since the Second Circuit's 1968 decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the scope and remedies under rule lOb-5 have been used extensively to attack insider
trading. See infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
28. Section 21 of the Exchange Act gives the Commission authority to investigate violations of that Act or the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982). The first critical example of the Commission exercising
its right against insider trading was in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Since then, the Commission has brought numerous actions
against various insider traders. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (board chairman of a real estate
investment trust violated the antifraud rules by failing to disclose inside information of a possible long-term lease); SEC
v. Fox, 654 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (employees of corporation did not possess material inside information and
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defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities. 29 As described and explained below, 30
the scope of that cause of action appeared for a time broad enough to make unlawful
any trading based on nonpublic information by any person who happened to possess
it,3 1 even when that trading person acted only negligently rather than with actual
intent to defraud. 32 In other words, it appeared for a time that section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 rendered unlawful all insider trading as above defined. Accordingly, although
the blue sky laws of most, if not all, states contained general antifraud provisions
similar to the federal provisions, 33 they were generally ignored, in large part because
of the procedural advantages available under the federal act.34
Recently the Supreme Court has in several ways narrowed the scope of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5. 35 The most critical of those narrowing interpretations respecting
the extent to which insider trading is a violation of the Exchange Act are those cases,
specifically Chiarella and Dirks, in which the Court has said that a person may
thus had no duty to disclose); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (profits disgorged from temporary insider
involving a tender offer under the misappropriation theory); SEC v Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (manager
of office services department of law finn disclosed nonpublic material information concerning firm's corporate clients);
In re Certain Trading in the Common Stock of Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249 (1973) (Commission obtains consent decree
for alleged insider trading).
29. A federal district court first implied a private right of action under rule lOb-5 in 1946. Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The U.S. Supreme Court's first explicit recognition of rule lOb-5's status
in private litigation was in Superintendent ofIns. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Although the 1970s
saw expansive treatment of implied rights of action, the Bankers Life Court never suggested it would continue expanding
implied rights. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court reviewed standing
considerations in rule lOb-5 damage actions; and in a later case, it scaled back implied rights of action under lOb-5,
requiring that the complained of conduct be "deceptive." Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (no cause of
action for shareholders squeezed out in an allegedly unfair short-form merger absent deceptive or manipulative conduct).
30. See infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
31. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974) (tippers who
possessed material, nonpublic information about a company and failed to disclose that information when they traded were
liable despite no express finding of any fiduciary duty).
32. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Various
circuits had discarded the scienter requirement for damages under rule lOb-5. Id. at 868 (Friendly, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court, however, has since made clear that.scienter is a requirement. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
33. Many states have enacted blue sky laws that embrace the underlying theme of rule lOb-5. Although a general
examination of blue sky laws is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note the similarity between rule lOb-5
and state law. Many states have adopted the Uniform Securities Act in some form. Section 101 is patterned after rule
lOb-5 and prohibits fraudulent and other practices:
In connection with an offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase, or purchase, of a security, a person may not directly
or indirectly:
(I) employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made not misleading, in light of the circumstances under which they are made; or
(3) engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
a person.
Uniform Securities Act § 501 (1985). Section 609 specifically bars implied rights of action under this Act, thus limiting
its effectiveness. See Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. MeAlester Aircraft, Inc., 349 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1965). See also
Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAw. 947 (1976).
34. "Rule lOb-5 allows for a broad choice of venue, world wide service of process, freedom from security for
expense requirement, and pendent jurisdiction over state causes of action." Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between
Federal Securities Law and State Corporation Law, 12 J. CoRp. L. 73, 78 n.37 (1986) (citing W. CARY & M. EtssssxG,
CO'oRAxrtOis 841-44 (5th ed. 1980)).
35. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Court adopted the Birnbaum
rule: to have standing to bring an action under rle lOb-5, one must be either a purchaser or a seller in a securities
transaction. Thus, a potential purchaser was barred from recovery. See also supra note 29.
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lawfully trade without disclosing nonpublic information unless he has an affirmative
duty to disclose.36 The possible sources of such a duty remain to be developed, but
among them is certainly any fiduciary duty owed by the trader to the corporation or
its shareholders under the applicable state common law.
Ironically, the extent to which a traditional insider trader can presently be
regulated under federal law depends largely on the extent to which that person is
subject to some fiduciary duty to disclose or refrain from realizing personal benefits
from his fiduciary relationship under state law. Normally only if such a person,
because he is a director, an officer, an employee or otherwise, owes a fiduciary duty
to disclose to the corporation or its shareholders will the Commission or a defrauded
investor be able to establish a federal law violation.
At the same time, if such a fiduciary duty to disclose exists, the persons to whom
the duty is owed, i.e., the corporation or its shareholders, will have a state law cause
of action for breach of the duty. Indeed, the state law cause of action may well be
broader than that under rule lOb-5 in that a fiduciary is likely to be held to a standard
of intrinsic fairness 37 rather than of scienter. 38 The burden of proof may be on the
fiduciary rather than on the plaintiff.3 9 Finally, if the duty is owed to the corporation,
regulation of insider trading, at least by traditional insiders and perhaps their tippees,
will be possible through shareholder derivative suits,no by persons who in fact
normally have no standing to utilize the federal remedy. 41 If, then, insider trading
engaged in by traditional insiders is to be effectively regulated over the next several
years, it will be because the state courts revive, endorse, and perhaps expand the long
controversial and innovative approach of Diamond v. Oreamuno,42 which held that
officers and directors of a New York corporation are accountable to that corporation
for any profits resulting from their trading in reliance on material inside
information. 43
36. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656 (1983).
37. See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
38. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976). "IMhe term 'scienter' refers to a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form
of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act." Id. at 194 n.12. The Hochfelder Court did not
address the question as to when reckless behavior would be enough for liability under § 10(b) and rule l0b-5.
39. The burden of proof is usually on the plaintiff; however, if the fiduciary's act involves a conflict of interest,
the burden of proof shifts to the fiduciary. Nearly two-thirds of the states have currently codified the common law in
statutes controlling conflicts of interest transactions. E. BRODSKY & M.P. ADAsrtt, LAW OE CoPsoRsAr OFncEas AND
DmacroRs § 3.02 (1984 & Supp. 1987). Some states require the transaction to be "just and reasonable" (e.g., CAL. CoRP.
CODE Ar. § 310(a)(3)), while others have a "fair and reasonable" test (e.g., N.Y. Bus. Cot'. LAw § 713(b)). Delaware
case law has firmly developed the fair and reasonable line of reasoning. See generally Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d
599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
40. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "derivative suit" as an action based "upon a primary right of the
corporation, but is asserted on [the corporation's] behalf by the stockholders because of the corporation's failure,
deliberate or otherwise, to act upon the primary right." BLAcC's LAW DicrONARY 399 (5th ed. 1979).
41. See supra note 35 and infra note 87.
42. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
43. Id. at 498-99, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW REGULATION
The relationship between a corporation and its directors and officers is of more
than an agency nature. It is of a fiduciary nature. 44 Traditionally, directors and
officers had a duty to exercise reasonable care in managing the business and affairs
of the corporation. 45 In addition, they have had a duty to act solely in the best
interests of the corporation rather than in their own best interests.46 In the past, those
duties did not include any requirement that an officer or director disclose material
nonpublic information prior to trading in the corporation's securities. 47 Today,
however, the courts are moving in the direction of creating and substantially
expanding the duties of officers and directors to disclose material information in more
circumstances, including cases of insider trading. 48
A. The Time of Beginnings
Under what has been referred to as the "majority rule, 49 an officer or director
owed no duty to disclose any information even when the trading transaction was with
an existing shareholder. In the case of Goodwin v. Agassiz,50 for example, the court
refused to provide a remedy for shareholders who sold their shares to certain directors
of the corporation who were aware of the possible existence of valuable copper
deposits. 51 Yet, long before even the promulgation of rule lOb-5,52 the majority rule
had been effectively rendered a minority position by two developments. 5 3
First, a substantial number of states adopted the "special facts" doctrine, first
articulated by the Supreme Court in 1909 in the landmark case of Strong v. Repide. 4
Under that approach, officers and directors have had an affirmative duty to disclose
nonpublic information when, in a face-to-face transaction, special circumstances or
44. In equity, a director owes the corporation complete loyalty, honesty, and good faith. The director's first duty
is to act wholly for the benefit of the corporation. This fiduciary duty forbids the director from placing himself in a position
where his individual interest clashes with his duty to the corporation. 3 W. FLEraiR, CYcLoPEDiA OF THE LAW OF PRrVATE
CoRPoRAoNs § 838 (penn. ed. 1986 & Supp. 1987).
45. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (Delaware law); General Rubber Co. v. Benedict,
215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915) (New York law).
46. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Fontheim v. Walker, 282 A.D. 373, 122
N.Y.S.2d 642 (1953).
47. Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 590 (N.Y. 1868) (no evidence of a false representation of a material fact
that induced the sale; nothing was done by the director to deceive the shareholder into purchasing the securities).
48. See infra notes 165-80 and accompanying text.
49. The "majority rule" originated in England. Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421 (1902); see generally Loss, The
Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders" in the United States, 33 MOD. L. REv. 34 (1970).
50. 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Although the directors of a commercial corporation stand in a relation
of trust to the corporation and are bound to exercise the strictest good faith in respect to its property and business, the
directors do not accept a position of trust toward individual shareholders of the corporation. Id. at 361, 186 N.E. at 660.
51. Id. at 363-64, 186 N.E. at 661. The court emphasized that the possibility of significant copper deposits was
at the time still somewhat speculative.
52. Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942. For the circumstances surrounding its adoption, see L. Loss,
FU=AmsrTAs OF SEcuRrEs REGULATION 820-29 (1984).
53. In fact, there is indication that the "majority rule" has been applied in pure form in only a handful of cases
during the last thirty years. See 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrs REurUtToN 1448 n.8 (1961).
54. 213 U.S. 419 (1909). Indeed, as early as 1937, one commentator suggested that the "special facts" doctrine
had become the majority (or at least the plurality) approach. Lake, The Use for Personal Profit of Knowledge Gained
While a Director, 9 Miss. L.J. 427, 448-49 (1937).
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special facts render nondisclosure unconscionable.55 Second, several jurisdictions
went so far as to require disclosure of nonpublic information to shareholders in all
face-to-face transactions irrespective of any special facts or circumstances.5 6 As a
result of these two early common law developments, officers and directors in most
jurisdictions have had an affirmative duty to disclose or refrain from trading, at least
in face-to-face transactions. Any breach of that duty has been actionable, however,
only by the defrauded shareholder, at least until some courts began to allow
corporations to recover fiduciaries' profits through derivative suits.
B. The Time of Evolution
If a fiduciary breaches his duty to individual shareholders by trading with them
without disclosing material inside information, it would seem that such activities
would also constitute a breach of duty to the corporation itself. Yet, that issue and the
appropriate remedy for such a breach of duty were simply not addressed by any court
until 1949.
In the case of Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,57 the Delaware Court of Chancery
first recognized a cause of action for the corporation for the recovery of insider
trading profits. The defendant Kennedy in Brophy "was employed in an 'executive
capacity' and as 'confidential secretary' to... a director and officer of Cities Service
Company." 5 8 By reason of this position, he discovered that Cities Service intended
to purchase its own shares on the market in quantities sufficient to cause the price to
rise. Based on this information, Kennedy purchased a block of stock and resold it at
a substantial profit following the anticipated purchases by Cities Service. The court
first determined that Kennedy was a fiduciary with a duty not to use confidential
information for his own personal gain.59 It then went on to emphasize that given the
equitable nature of the suit, the corporation was entitled to recover Kennedy's profits
whether or not the corporation actually suffered any loss.60 While Brophy contains
some references to the law of trusts and the law of restitution, 6 1 it can and should be
viewed as a significant expansion of a fiduciary's duty of loyalty to the corporation. 62
55. In Strong v. Repide, a purchase of stock was rescinded when the general manager and a controlling shareholder
of the corporation failed to disclose that some of the corporation's land was likely to be sold for a very favorable price.
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
56. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530,
16 P.2d 531 (1932); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
57. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
58. Id. at 243, 70 A.2d at 7.
59. Id. at 244, 70 A.2d at 7.
60. Id. at 247, 70 A.2d at 8. Despite the court's emphasis, it should be noted that the corporation indeed may have
been harmed. Presumably Kennedy's purchase of a large block of stock caused some increase in the market price, making
the corporation's purchases more costly.
61. The Brophy court based part of its opinion on the law of trusts and the law of restitution to bolster its conclusion
that "if an employee in the course of his employment acquires secret information relating to his employer's business, he
occupies a position of trust and confidence toward it, analogous in most respects to that of a fiduciary, and must govern
his actions accordingly." Id. at 244, 70 A.2d at 7.
62. Although the unequivocal language of the court supports this view, it can be argued that Kennedy's breach was
in fact merely competing with the corporation to obtain available shares. If that analysis is correct, the case represents no
breakthrough as a fiduciary has long been liable for either competing directly with the corporation or usurping a corporate
opportunity. See generally Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (the president of a corporation engaged in the
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Although Brophy was a change in the common law, it was of little consequence
until the New York Court of Appeals relied on it heavily to decide Diamond v.
Oreamuno63 in 1969. Diamond involved a typical insider trading fact pattern. The
defendants included Oreamuno, chairman of the board of directors of Management
Assistance, Inc. ("MAI") and Gonzalez, its president. Through their positions
Oreamuno and Gonzalez became aware that MAI had suffered a substantial decrease
in earnings. Knowing that the price of the stock would be adversely affected by the
publication of that information, Oreamuno and Gonzalez sold 56,000 shares of MAI
stock at $28 per share. Immediately following the disclosure of the bad news, the
price fell to $11. The court held that the corporation was entitled to $800,000,
essentially the loss avoided by the two insiders.
The New York Court of Appeals held squarely that the use of confidential
information for personal gain constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties owed to a
New York corporation irrespective of whether the corporation was a party to the
transaction and even if the corporation suffered no harm.64 Unfortunately for the
future of the Diamond approach in other courts, at least until recently, 65 the court
went on to justify its position by adding policy arguments that have instead been used
to undercut the primary analysis. 66 First, the court noted that the corporation may
well have suffered harm, for example, to its reputation. 67 Second, the court suggested
that its approach could be justified in part because the federal remedies were an
inadequate deterrent to insider trading. 68 Indeed, the court's unreasonable concern
with the possibility of preemption suggests that one reason for the Diamond approach
was to fill a gap. 69 When the perceived gap appeared to be filled by the expanding
federal law spurred by the seminal decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,70 the Diamond rationale was effectively put on
the "back burner."
manufacture and sale of candies, syrups, and beverages had obtained Pepsi's secret formula and trademark, but did not
make it available to his corporation). Guth makes it clear that one who is "entrusted with the active management of a
corporation... may not exploit his position as an 'insider' by appropriating to himself a business opportunity properly
belonging to the corporation." Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974).
63. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
64. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
65. See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text. Although the approach was heavily criticized by certain courts
for almost twenty years, it was received favorably by a substantial number of commentators. Wimberly, Corporate
Recovery ofInsider Trading Profits at Common Law, 8 Cor'. L. Ray. 197, 200-01 (1985). The cases are praised for their
progressive views concerning fiduciary responsibilities. See generally Note, Common Law Corporate Recovery for
Trading on Non-Public Information, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 269 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Common Law Corporate
Recovery]; Recent Cases, Corporations: Diamond v. Oreamuno, 83 HIARv. L. Ray. 1421 (1970); Recent Decision,
Corporations-Derivative Actions-Officers and Directors Are Accountable for Personal Profits from Company Stock Sold
on the Basis ofInside Information, 55 VA. L. Rav. 1520 (1969).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 86-111. For a very recent solid endorsement of the approach, however, see
In re Orfa Sees. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.J. 1987). For a discussion of that case, see infra text accompanying notes
150-57.
67. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82 (1969).
68. Id. at 503, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
69. As the court notes, "'Congress expressly provided against any implication that it intended to pre-empt the field
... in section 28(a) of the [Exchange Act]." Id. at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
70. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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C. The Time of Dormancy
Although the federal regulation of insider trading began theoretically with the
promulgation of rule lOb-5 in 1942,71 it evolved gingerly much as had the state
common law as described above72 until the Commission stepped in to curb the
practice. In deciding In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,73 the Commission ruled that a
broker-dealer who received nonpublic information about an imminent dividend
decrease from a director of the corporation violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by
selling stock of that corporation for himself and his customers in the absence of
disclosure.74 The basis for that 1961 ruling was that the tippee broker-dealer acquired
a duty to disclose or refrain from trading from the tipper director who, according to
the opinion, was clearly subject to such a duty. 75 Cady, Roberts was the first instance
in which rule lOb-5 was applied to stock exchange rather than face-to-face
transactions. 76 Since it was an administrative proceeding against a regulated
broker-dealer, however, its significance in terms of foreshadowing an increasingly
expansive interpretation of rule lOb-5 to regulate insider trading was then doubtful. 77
On August 13, 1968, less than a year before the Diamond decision, the Second
Circuit eliminated all such doubt when it decided the second of the Commission's
enforcement actions against insider traders. The facts in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,78
interestingly, were reminiscent of Goodwin v. Agassiz79 discussed above. Again,
several of Texas Gulf's officers, directors, and executive employees acquired
knowledge of the corporation's discovery of valuable mineral deposits and without
disclosing such confidential information both made substantial purchases of Texas
Gulf shares over various stock exchanges and tipped others who in turn made such
purchases. Not only did the court establish that rule lOb-5 prohibited insider trading
by holding several of the individual defendants liable, but it went on to explain that
the rule requires that "anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it .... must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed."-80 Its stated rationale for this expansive interpre-
tation, going well beyond traditional fiduciary concepts, was that the policy
71. Section 10(b) makes unlawful only such manipulative or deceptive acts as are "in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ...." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). In the absence of an appropriate rule,
i.e., rule lOb-5, § 10(b) could simply not be the basis for insider trading or any other liability.
72. There were a number of cases brought under rule lOb-5 by purchasers or sellers of securities against fiduciaries
who traded on inside information. Like the state law cases, they all involved face-to-face transactions. See R. Jaomms
& H. MARsH, SEcuarrmas RouoLArloN 1043 (6th ed. 1987). For a list of those early cases, see id. at 1043 n. I. See also
Hazen, supra note 17, at 847.
73. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
74. Id. at 911.
75. Id. at 912.
76. See supra note 72.
77. Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, supra note 2, at 461.
78. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
79. 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
80. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The court,
however, recognized that disclosure would have constituted a breach of the duty to keep silent in order to facilitate the
corporation's land acquisition program. Id. at 874. Accordingly, the only lawful option was to abstain from trading.
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underlying rule lOb-5 was that all investors justifiably expect to have equal access to
material information. 81
The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision and the numerous insider trading cases that
followed 82 provided until recently a powerful weapon for enforcement actions by the
Commission and an extremely broad private right of action for defrauded investors
against all persons who violated the disclose or abstain rule, including those who
traded, those who tipped but did not trade, and all tippees. 83 As a result, the evolution
of the common law regulation of insider trading, while not technically preempted, 84
was in the words of one commentator "aborted. '" 85
While the development of a common law remedy for an investor defrauded by
an insider trader was effectively superseded by the blossoming federal law, 86 the
Diamond approach to insider trading with its remedy for the corporation whose shares
were being traded fared worse, despite the fact that the federal law still provided no
equivalent remedy. 87 Diamond was never overruled in New York, but it became
dormant. Similarly, Brophy was on occasion acknowledged to be good law in
Delaware during this period, but its development remained in abeyance. 88
As noted above, there are strong common law bases for the Diamond approach
to insider trading grounded in principles of fiduciary duty, as well as agency, trusts,
and restitution. 89 Nevertheless, it was resoundingly rejected in the only two cases that
squarely involved the issue during the decade following its promulgation and the
contemporaneous Texas Gulf Sulphur decision. The approach first surfaced in Schein
v. Chasen,90 a series of cases involving complications both in fact pattern and in
procedural posture. Originally certain stockholders of Lum's, Inc., a Florida
corporation, brought a derivative action against the corporation's president and a
series of tippees in the federal courts of New York under diversity jurisdiction.
Essentially Chasen, Lum's president, had informed an employee of a stockbroker that
Lum's earnings would be lower than previously projected. In turn the employee
informed certain mutual funds who sold their shares prior to the public announce-
81. Id. at 848.
82. Even as Texas Gulf Sulphur was being decided, 49 private actions were already pending in the district court.
Id. at 866. For a more complete analysis of the federal insider trading cases, which is beyond the scope of this Article's
treatment of the common law regulation, see L. Loss, supra note 52, at 799-944.
83. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
84. See § 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
85. L. Loss, supra note 52, at 820.
86. But see Lazenby v. Godwin, 40 N.C. App. 487, 253 S.E.2d 489 (1979).
87. The implied right of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is available only to purchasers or sellers of securities.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). A corporation would have standing under rule lOb-5,
directly or through a derivative suit, however, in the event the corporation actually purchased or sold its securities; but
it is difficult to imagine this posture in an insider trading case.
88. Thomas v. Roblin Indus., 520 F.2d 1393, 1397 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying Delaware law); Cambridge Fund, Inc.
v. Abella, 501 F. Supp. 598, 630-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Delaware law); Davidge v. White, 377 F. Supp 1084,
1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying Delaware law); see also some positive mention of the Brophy or Diamond approach in
Jennings v. Roberts Scott & Co., 113 Ariz. 57, 59, 546 P.2d 343, 345 (1976); Katz Corp. v. T.H. Canty & Co., 168
Conn. 201, 211, 362 A.2d 975, 980 (1975); but see Equity Corp. v. Milton, 42 Del. Ch. 425, 432-33, 213 A.2d 439,
443 (1965), aff'd, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 221 A.2d 494 (1966).
89. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. See also Hazen, supra note 17, at 848.
90. Schein involved a number of cases: Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973),judgment vacated sub nom.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), certif. question answered sub nom. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739
(Fla. 1975).
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ments. All persons in the chain of tipping and trading were aware that the adverse
information was not yet public. 9'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on and extending to tippees
the Diamond approach, held that under Florida law all of the defendants, as part of
a "common enterprise," were accountable to the corporation for the profits, i.e., the
losses avoided from trading on the inside information. 92 One of the three judges
dissented on the merits of extending the Diamond fiduciary duty concept to tippees
and further argued that the question should have been certified to the Florida Supreme
Court. 93 The United States Supreme Court agreed with the latter point and so
remanded the case. 94
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the liability of the tippees only, relegating
to dicta its wholesale rejection of the Diamond approach. Yet the court's language
cannot be completely ignored. After endorsing Judge Kaufman's dissenting view that
the tippees, unlike the corporation's officers, directors, employees, or agents, had no
fiduciary obligation to Lum's, 95 the court went on to reject not only the liability of the
tippees, but also the entire principle enunciated in Diamond.96 The immediate stated
reason was that some actual damage to the corporation was an essential element for
a stockholder's derivative action in Florida.97 Although the court took "note with
interest" that the Commission had also filed an enforcement action under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 against all of the defendants, 98 it is difficult under the
circumstances of a limited certified question to infer in what manner the federal action
actually influenced, if at all, the court's view of the Diamond approach.
The more major set-back for the future of the Diamond approach came in 1978
when it was again rejected, this time by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
applying Indiana law. Freeman v. Decio,99 unlike Schein, did not involve a possible
extension of the Diamond approach, but simply its possible adoption in a typical case
of insider trading by officers and directors. Once again, the plaintiff shareholder of
Skyline Corporation, whose stock was publicly traded, alleged that three directors,
including one who was also the chief executive officer and the largest shareholder of
Skyline, became aware of a reduction in anticipated earnings and without any public
disclosure sold Skyline stock in order to reduce their losses. The court considered
squarely whether the Indiana courts would adopt the Diamond approach or join the
Florida Supreme Court's rejection of the principle that a corporation is entitled to
recover from its fiduciaries who trade based on inside information. 10 Although it
admitted that the question was a "close one," the court concluded that the Indiana
91. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 820 (2d Cir. 1973),judgment vacatedsub noma. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386 (1974).
92. Id. at 822.
93. Id. at 825-29 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
94. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
95. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
96. Id. at 746.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 746-47.
99. 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
100. Id. at 189.
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courts would refuse to adopt what it characterized as the New York court's
"innovative ruling." 10 '
In light of the current importance of state common law regulation of insider
trading, 0 2 the reasoning of the Freeman decision must be carefully examined.
Although the court indicated that "it is widely accepted that insider trading should be
deterred because it is unfair to other investors who do not enjoy the benefits of access
to inside information,"'' 0 3 it also noted that the "goal of 'market egalitarianism' may
be costly." 0 4 Ultimately, its balance in favor of rejecting the Diamond approach
seemed to be based on its view, quite the opposite from that of the New York Court
of Appeals, that the existing remedies, primarily federal, for controlling insider
trading were adequate. Focussing on the dicta in Diamond, the Seventh Circuit
pointed to a possible recovery for the corporation under section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act,105 a possible action by the Commission primarily under rule lOb-5 for a variety
of remedies,0 6 a possible action by the "victims" of insider trading under state
law, 10 7 and most important, the likelihood of actions by the "victims" under the rule
lOb-5 private right of action.' 0 8 As to the last, the court took note of the fact, correct
at the time, that many of the elements of common law fraud, such as "privity,
reliance, and the distinction between misrepresentation and non-disclosure''109 and
causation1 ' had been significantly relaxed, making the rule a favorite and effective
vehicle for damage suits against insider traders."' While the circuit court went on to
discuss other difficulties with the Diamond approach," 12 the essence of the decision
was disagreement with the New York court's view that its result was necessary to
supplement the then inadequate federal law regulation of insider trading. In light of
the decreased adequacy of the federal remedies following the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks, 13 the reasoning underlying Freeman, as
opposed to that underlying Diamond, is today at best doubious.
D. The Time of Resurgence
Throughout the years during which the various federal courts broadly construed
the remedy under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in order to deter insider trading to the
greatest extent possible, the Supreme Court never directly addressed the issue of
whether all or only some persons are subject to the disclose or abstain from trading
101. Id. at 196.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
103. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 190.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 191.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); but see Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
111. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978).
112. See id. at 192-96.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 120-41.
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and tipping rule. 114 It did, however, narrow the scope of the rule lOb-5 private right
of action generally by "tightening up" the previously "watered down" elements of
privity, 1 5 materiality, 116 and scienter,117 as well as by removing from the federal
sphere activities not clearly "manipulative" or "deceptive" under a narrow
construction of those section 10(b) terms."18 The blows dealt to the federal regulation
of insider trading by the United States Supreme Court in Chiarella and again in Dirks
were, therefore, no surprise.
As stated above, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf
Sulphur based its conclusion that all possessors of inside information have a duty to
disclose or not trade or tip on the principle that all investors should have equal access
to all material information. 119 In its 1980 decision in the case of Chiarella v. United
States, 20 the Supreme Court rejected both that principle and its underlying analysis.
Chiarella involved the activities of a printer, a "markup man" in the offices of
Pandick Press, a regularly used New York City financial printer.' 2 1 Chiarella, an
apparently sophisticated person, was able to deduce the names of target companies in
forthcoming tender offers based on the offering materials despite the use of code
names. He then purchased the securities and resold them at substantial premiums. 122
The Commission, after discovering this pattern of events, took action against
Chiarella successfully' 23 until the enforcement action reached the Supreme Court in
the context of a criminal proceeding. In that context, the Supreme Court decided that
Chiarella had not violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 because he had no duty to
disclose the inside information to the sellers of the target companies' securities.
The Court stated unequivocally that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information,"'' 24 and more
specifically that:
No duty could arise from [Chiarella's] relationship with the sellers of the target company's
securities, for [Chiarella] had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions.-an
114. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the Supreme Court did conclude that the
defendant bank and two of its individual employees were liable for the Ute's losses because, among other things, they
possessed an affirmative duty to disclose that they were market makers in the securities involved and were using their
long-standing position of trust for their own financial gain. Id. at 152-53.
115. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see also Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
116. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
117. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
118. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
119. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit repeated the same conclusion to uphold
Chiarella's conviction. Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 ( 2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
120. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
121. Id. at 224.
122. Id.
123. SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77-2534 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1977), motion to dismiss denied, 450 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 942 (1979).
124. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
125. Id. at 232-33.
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Referring often to the "common law," 126 the Court saw no state law fiduciary duty
owed by Chiarella to the persons from whom he purchased securities. 127 In addition,
while endorsing the holding of Cady, Roberts, 28 the Court saw no such duty of
"trust and confidence" 129 that arose from
(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider
to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure. 30
Chiarella remains confusing. If a common law duty was essential, as it appears to
have been, the possible sources of any such duty remain unclear. While probably a
majority of states now recognize a common law duty of disclosure to shareholders of
a corporation by its trading officers and directors, 13 1 that duty would never extend to
the Chiarella fact pattern.132 In addition, while Chief Justice Burger suggested that
the duty to disclose requirement was satisfied by Chiarella's misappropriation of
information in violation of a duty to his employer, Pandick Press, 133 that basis for a
duty to disclose was not addressed by the Court in Chiarella nor in the later case of
Carpenter v. United States'34 involving the same issue.
Three years following its decision in Chiarella, the Supreme Court again
addressed the duty to disclose requirement for rule lOb-5 liability for insider trading,
this time in the context of a tippee of inside information. In the case of Dirks v.
SEC,135 Dirks, an officer of a broker-dealer specializing in providing investment
analysis to institutional investors, was informed by Secrist, a former officer of Equity
Funding, that the assets of the corporation were "vastly overstated" 1 36 as a result of
a fraudulent scheme. Dirks proceeded to investigate the matter and in the course of
doing so openly discussed the alleged fraud with a number of investors, some of
whom relied on the information in selling their shares of Equity Funding. The
Supreme Court found Dirks not liable for tipping the material inside information
because it concluded that he had no pre-existing duty to disclose before trading or
tipping.' 3 7 Again the Court emphasized that a duty arises not from "the mere
possession of nonpublic market information,"' 138 but rather from the existence of a
126. See id. at 227, 229; see also Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,436 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988) (a former shareholder employee of a corporation brought an action against the corporation for
fraud in inducing the plaintiff to sell his stock; the court found that closely held corporations must disclose material
information to investors from whom it purchases stock); Hazen, supra note 17, at 851.
127. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
128. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 & n.21 (1961).
129. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
130. Id. at 227 (citing with approval In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 & n.15 (1961)).
131. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
132. As indicated above, the common law duty to disclose has been limited to face-to-face transactions and has not
been extended to stock exchange transactions. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
133. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-43 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). The Court had before it the misappropriation of information issue; however, it avoided
the question by finding liability based on a violation of the mail frauds statute. The Court's 4-4 split on the
misappropriation theory as a basis for a federal law duty to disclose leaves the issue in doubt. See generally Aldave, supra
note 16.
135. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
136. Id. at 649.
137. Id. at 654.
138. Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)).
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fiduciary relationship. 139 In the case of a tippee like Dirks, any such duty could be
derived from Secrist's duty,140 but only if Secrist had breached his duty by disclosing
the information. Since Secrist received no personal benefit from tipping Dirks, he
breached no duty and therefore, the Court reasoned, Dirk's acquired no derivative
duty.141
It is now clear that insider trading constitutes a violation of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 only if the trader has a common law duty to speak. The legal sources of such
a duty have therefore become crucial. While the courts could look to a federal
common law, it is more likely that "[t]he obligation to break silence is itself based
on state law,"' 142 the duty normally being the fiduciary duty of corporate law. 143 In
light of the renewed importance of any relevant state law duty to disclose or refrain
from insider trading, it is likely that the existing state law will undergo at least
substantial redefinition' 44 and almost certainly some expansion. Otherwise, any
effective future regulation of insider trading under either federal or state law will be
impossible.
As explained above, corporate officers and directors and controlling sharehold-
ers in most, if not all, states have a duty to disclose material nonpublic information
in a face-to-face transaction. 145 That duty could be expanded to include employees,
tippees, and various other persons; and it could be extended to apply to transactions
over the exchanges. Such changes would broaden the remedy for the defrauded
investors on both the federal and state level. Yet large numbers of suits by individuals
who traded are unlikely given the difficulties of establishing all of the elements of a
rule lOb-5 or state common law cause of action. 146 Also, while an expanded state law
duty to disclose running to investors would satisfy the Commission's need for a duty
to enable it to vigorously combat insider trading, the Commission's resources are
limited. 147 A much more effective and desirable weapon against insider traders is that
selected by the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond.148 If the Diamond approach
were to be extensively recognized and perhaps expanded, that state law duty of
disclosure owed to the corporation would make a rule lOb-5 action available to the
139. Id.
140. Id. at 655.
141. Id. at 661-67.
142. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988);
see also Hazen, supra note 17, at 851-52.
143. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
144. Id. at 436.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
146. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
147. Between 1974 and 1976, the National Association of Securities Dealers reported 186 suspected insider trading
cases to the Commission. Only 20% were investigated, and in only one in sixty was an actual action bought. See Flood
ofInsider Trading Referrals to SEC Results in Trickle of Investigations, Lawsuits, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 412,
at A-4, A-5 (July 20, 1977). The situation has not improved. Senate Banking Securities Subcommittee Chairman Donald
Riegle (D-Mich.) recently noted that while reports indicate "explosive growth in securities trading," there continues to
be a lack of funds for SEC market regulation and investment management staff. See More Inside Trading Cases by This
Summer, Shad Predicts, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 704 (May 15, 1987). For further description of the extent
to which the Commission has been able to deter insider trading through enforcement actions, see Bainbridge, The Insider
Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. Rav. 35, 40-43 (1986); Note, A Critique of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act, supra note 2, at 466-67.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
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Commission and to the defrauded investors. But, more important would be the
powerful weapon of the derivative suit by which the shareholders of the corporation
involved could vigorously and effectively deter insider trading, at least by traditional
insiders and perhaps others, to the benefit of the corporation's reputation and the
integrity of the markets for its securities.
Fortunately, the resurgence of the Diamond approach is at hand. Although that
approach has been considered by only a few courts since its original adoption, it
continues to be the law in New York and Delaware. Indeed, albeit without particular
discussion, it has been recognized as the law of Delaware subsequent to the Chiarella
decision. 149 The wave of the future, however, was foreshadowed by the very recent
case of In re Orfa Securities Litigation,150 in which the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey concluded that under New Jersey common law there
was a derivative cause of action available against four individual corporate officers' 5'
who traded without disclosing material nonpublic information.152 The stock of Orfa
Corporation was trading on the national over-the-counter market. The defendant
officers knew that various public documents contained inaccurate favorable informa-
tion about the corporation which had the effect of inflating the price of its stock.
Without disclosing such inaccuracies, they sold over a four-month period consider-
able amounts of stock. When the true state of affairs became public, the price of the
stock, of course, immediately plummetted.153
After reviewing the status of the Diamond approach in those four states where
the courts had addressed the issue, the district court with little "ado" adopted it as
a reasonable application of the basic proposition that a corporate fiduciary "may not
exploit inside information for personal gain"'' 1 4 to the insider trading situation. 155
Like the court in Freeman, however, the court held harm to be a necessary element
of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.' 56 Unlike the Freeman court, though, the Orfa
court appeared to anticipate that harm to the corporate goodwill would be adequate
and probably provable.15 7
V. THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW REGULATION
The effective regulation of insider trading, in part because of the Chiarella and
Dirks decisions,' 5 8 is in a state of disarray. Under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, there
is now a federal remedy only if the insider trader had a fiduciary duty to disclose or
149. Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (D. Utah 1982); see also supra
note 88.
150. 654 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.J. 1987).
151. Each individual officer also owned between 10% and 15% of the corporation's outstanding stock. Accordingly,
there may have also been a duty to disclose resulting from their status as controlling shareholders either as individuals or
as a group ld. at 1451.
152. Id. at 1455.
153. The corporation's stock price dropped 50% in just a three-day period over the weekend. Id. at 1452-53.
154. Id. at 1456.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1457.
157. Id. at 1457-58.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 120-41.
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refrain from trading or tipping. At the same time, however, the state law development
of the scope of fiduciary duty in the insider trading area had been "aborted" 159 by the
then seemingly adequate federal remedies. Yet today, the desire to curb insider
trading has become a top priority with the President,1 60 with Congress, 161 with state
legislatures, 162 with a majority of commentators, 163 and, albeit guardingly according
to the Freeman court, with most courts. 164 While no solution in the absence of
perhaps specific legislation will address the problem as broadly as is called for,
widespread adoption and expansion of the Diamond approach will and should
effectively deter a very substantial amount of insider trading. For various reasons,
that result is both likely and desirable.
A. The Soundness of the Diamond Approach
The recognition of the Diamond approach is consistent with, if not mandated by,
the constantly evolving corporate law of fiduciary duty. Under that state law, the duty
to disclose at least in Delaware has expanded to the point where it now dominates the
law of fiduciary duty in a variety of transactions. 165 Indeed, it can easily be stated
today that "disclosure and fiduciary duty are inextricably intertwined. ' 166
This "shift to a disclosure-based standard of fiduciary duty,"' 167 while perhaps
only recently culminating in Delaware, is neither novel nor unexpected. The duty to
disclose has long been a part of a fiduciary's obligations to his corporation. For
example, in Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,168 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a majority stockholder breached its duty by causing the redemption
of certain convertible securities instead of permitting those securityholders to share
159. See L. Loss, supra note 52, at 820.
160. See supra note 2.
161. Id.
162. A number of state legislatures, in light of Chiarella and Dirks, have amended their state blue sky laws to
broaden the remedies available against insider traders. For example, the California Corporate Code directly addresses
insider trading:
It is unlawful for an issuer or any person who is an officer, director or controlling person of an issuer or
any person whose relationship to the issuer gives him access, directly or indirectly, to material information about
the issuer not generally available to the public, to purchase or sell any security of the issuer in this state at a time
when he knows material information about the issuer gained from such relationship which would significantly
affect the market price of that security and which is not generally available to the public, and which he knows
is not intended to be so available, unless he has reason to believe that the person selling or buying from him is
also in possession of the information.
CAL. CORP. CoDE § 25405 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988). New Mexico has recently enacted a similar law which became
effective on July 1, 1986. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-32 (1987). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-406 (Purdon Supp.
1984-85); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 21.20.480 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988).
Additionally, courts have begun to construe the state blue sky laws broadly as a further possible deterrent to insider
trading. See e.g., Olson, The California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 9 SAnA CLsA LAw. 75 (1968); Comment,
Proof of Fault in Actions for Securities Fraud: A Cloud in Pennsylvania's Blue Sky, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1083 (1985);
Casenote, Blue Sky Law -New YorkBlue Sky LawAntifraud Provision Used to Impose Criminal Liability on Attorney Who
Engaged in Insider Trading, 13 U. BALT. L. RE. 631 (1984).
163. See supra note 19.
164. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978).
165. See generally Booth, supra note 34.
166. Id. at 103. Of course, sometimes the fiduciary duty is to maintain the confidentiality of information in order
to accomplish a legitimate corporate purpose. See, e.g., supra note 80.
167. Booth, supra note 34, at 78-79.
168. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
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in the forthcoming liquidation of the corporation. 169 As the ultimate award of
damages made clear,170 the nature of the breach was not effecting the transactions, but
rather failing to disclose that the redemption would be followed by liquidation to
enable those securityholders to exercise their conversion rights and thereby share in
the assets upon liquidation of the corporation.
Somewhat more recently, in the context of a majority stockholder's tender offer
to purchase all of the outstanding minority stock, 171 the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded that the majority stockholder and its directors had breached their fiduciary
duty of "complete candor" by failing to disclose "all information in their possession
germane to the transaction." ' 172 Most recently, the Delaware Supreme Court took an
enormous step in expanding the fiduciary duty to disclose when it decided
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 173 in 1983. Weinberger involved a merger of a subsidiary
into the parent corporation in which the minority stockholders were "cashed out."
Again, the court based its decision that the parent had breached its fiduciary duty' 74
on its failure to disclose to the minority stockholders all information relevant to the
fairness of the merger price.' 75 Finally, in the very recent case of Smith v. Van
Gorkom,176 involving the sale of all of the assets of a corporation for cash, the
Delaware Supreme Court focussed on the inadequacy of disclosure in the proxy
materials and refused to give any effect to what it regarded as an uninformed
stockholder vote. 177
The duty owed to a corporation by traditional insiders has become at least in
Delaware largely a duty of disclosure, a duty requiring arguably more information
than would satisfy the materiality standard under federal law. This expanded duty to
disclose has been characterized by the Delaware Supreme Court itself as merely
another way of recognizing "the long-existing principle of Delaware law that .. .
[fiduciaries] owed ... an uncompromising duty of loyalty."' 178 As one commentator
recently noted, the courts "appear to be more willing to find directorial breaches than
ever before.' 1 79 Accordingly, widespread endorsement and expansion of the
Diamond approach, involving the recognition of a broad duty owed to the corporation
to disclose or refrain from insider trading or tipping, is almost certainly at hand.180
169. Id. at 46.
170. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 1956).
171. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
172. Id. at 281.
173. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
174. Id. at 703.
175. Id. at 709.
176. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
177. Id. at 874-78, 889-93.
178. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
179. Booth, supra note 34, at 78 & n.41; see also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981)
(recognition of a more expanded fiduciary duty in the reinsurance industry under New Jersey law).
180. While other remedies are possible given the broad equitable discretion of the state courts, disgorgement as
provided by Diamond for the benefit of the corporation is most appropriate since the breach is based on the unfairness of
the gain rather than on direct harm to the corporation. See Hazen, supra note 17, at 859 & n.95.
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B. The Benefits of the Diamond Approach
The continued adoption and development of the Diamond approach should occur
because of the many advantages and benefits surrounding this method of regulating
insider trading. As stated above, if under state law a person, such as a traditional
insider, an employee, or even a tippee, 181 has a fiduciary duty to the corporation to
disclose or refrain from insider trading, that state law duty will satisfy the federal
requirement of a fiduciary duty under rule lOb-5.182 The more significant advantages
of the approach, however, derive from the state law remedy itself. Most important,
the corporation whose shares are traded will finally be able to take enforcement
actions against insider traders. 183 Simply put, as the number of possible plaintiffs,
and consequently the number of actions against insider traders, increase, the goal of
deterring the practice will be increasingly achieved.
Also noteworthy is the likelihood that the corporation may be a more zealous and
effective policer of insider trading. 184 Unlike others it has several powerful incentives
to sue insider traders. As mentioned in Diamond,185 perceived or actual insider
trading may injure the corporation's reputation, which could in turn affect its ability
to raise capital, to attract customers or employees, or otherwise adversely affect the
corporation's ability to conduct business successfully in ways perhaps not yet
anticipated. In addition, individual officers and directors who become aware of
insider trading will likely take action against the culprits to avoid the possibility of
breaching their own duties of due care by failing to pursue the matter on behalf of the
corporation. 186 Finally, since corporate officers are closer to trading activities in the
corporation's stock and to any not yet disclosed material information about the
corporation, they are perhaps more likely than the Commission or individual
investors to detect particular insider trading activities. 187
Of most importance in terms of the long term effective regulation of insider
trading is that the cause of action available to the corporation will and should be a
more powerful weapon than any of the alternatives under the existing state or federal
law. The gravamen of the fiduciary's typical violation is trading on the basis of
nonpublic material information itself, nothing more. Accordingly, once the corpo-
ration establishes that the insider trader is a fiduciary and that he traded without
disclosing the information of which he was aware or perhaps should have been
aware, 188 the result is clear. Presumably there should be no need to establish other
181. See infra text accompanying notes 193-99.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48.
183. The nontrading corporation has no standing to utilize any other remedy except, in some circumstances, that
contained in § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. See supra notes 21-22, 35 & 87.
184. See generally Comment, Inside Information and Outside Traders, supra note 2, at 513-16.
185. See supra note 66.
186. Comment, Inside Information and Outside Traders, supra note 2, at 514 & nn. 167-68.
187. Id. at 515.
188. Since scienter is normally not required to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, the courts could and likely would
impose liability on a fiduciary who traded while negligently believing the confidential information had become public. See
supra note 37; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
709 (Del. 1983).
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elements, such as causation or actual damages. 189 Furthermore, to the extent there are
issues of fact, it seems likely and appropriate that, given the inherent conflict of
interest involved, the burden of proof should and will be on the alleged insider
trader.190
Finally, there is reason to believe that the Diamond approach will also be
construed to provide the corporation with a remedy against insider traders who are not
traditional insiders. Those categories of persons who owe a fiduciary duty to refrain
from insider trading under state law can be expanded, regardless of the Chiarella and
Dirks decisions under federal law. The extent of such judicial expansion of the
Diamond approach will depend on the various courts' views of how far the regulation
of insider trading should go. As Brophy suggests,191 the duty could easily be extended
to employees of the corporation, even temporary employees such as lawyers,
accountants, and others who because of their services to the corporation, acquire
nonpublic information. 192 In the event that a state's policy is to curb insider trading
to the fullest extent possible, a strong argument can be made that tippees of corporate
fiduciaries are also subject to the fiduciary duty to refrain from insider trading and
would be liable to the corporation for any profits resulting from the violation of that
duty. Indeed, in its decision in Schein v. Chasen,193 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit extended the Diamond approach to hold liable a corporate officer, a
tipped and tipper employee of a stockbroker, the stockbroker, and several tippee
investors, in sum the entire chain of tippers and tippees. 19 4 The basis for imposing the
fiduciary duty of a traditional insider on those outsiders was the court's finding that
they were involved with "directors in a common enterprise to misuse confidential
corporate information for their own enrichment.' '195 As to the meaning of "common
enterprise," the court implied that it could be presumed from "the sequence of
events.' 1 96 While some would take issue with the soundness of the articulated basis
for the court's extension of the Diamond approach to tippees, 19 7 it is certainly, as the
majority noted, consistent with the policy of "tightening the law of insider
trading.' 1 98 Should that be the goal, state courts could and should utilize the
Diamond approach as extended by the Second Circuit. If that court's view is widely
endorsed, the state law has the potential to regulate nearly all insider trading as
defined for purposes of this Article. 199
189. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 247, 70 A.2d 5, 8 (1949); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 498, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969); but cf. In re Orfa Secs. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1457
(D.N.J. 1987).
190. See supra note 39.
191. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 245, 70 A.2d 5, 8 (1949).
192. In fact, the Commission has used the constructive or temporary insider theory, first mentioned by the Supreme
Court in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). See, e.g., SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(a friend of a corporate insider, because of his relationship with the insider, was held a temporary insider and had to
disgorge profits obtained from possessing material, nonpublic information).
193. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), judgment vacated sub nor. Lehman Bros. v. Sehein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
194. Id. at 820.
195. Id. at 822.
196. Id.
197. Judge Kaufman dissented to extending Diamond to tippees. Id. at 825 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 823.
199. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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C. The Problems with the Diamond Approach
Although the Diamond approach is much in tune with current state court views
of the fiduciary duty of complete disclosure, and while it is capable of providing the
most extensive and effective regulation of insider trading, its endorsement and
expansion are not without certain problems. Upon further examination of those
so-called problems, pointed out primarily in the Schein2°° and Freeman20 1 decisions,
it appears that they are on balance both manageable and much overshadowed by the
several benefits of the Diamond approach to the regulation of insider trading as
outlined above. 202
The Florida Supreme Court in Schein rejected the Diamond approach because it
concluded that actual harm to the corporation is an essential element for a
stockholder's derivative suit in Florida.20 3 In those jurisdictions where such is the
law, one possible solution is a broad construction of what constitutes "harm" to the
corporation in the context of insider trading. Indeed, that approach was the one taken
by the district court in the recent Orfa decision making the Diamond approach the
present law in New Jersey. 204 Furthermore, the existence of harm, or a provable
amount of harm, to the corporation is not essential to a state court's ability to fashion
a suitable remedy. Courts of equity have traditionally been able to fashion suitable
remedies, 205 including the disgorgement of profits, that is rescissionary damages, 206
an accounting based on a constructive trust theory, 207 and even damage awards
unrelated to the amount of harm caused by the particular breach of fiduciary duty. 208
Even were a court to limit the damages to only those that were actually established,
a recognition of nothing more than nominal damages would support a further award
of punitive damages, 20 9 presumably an effective and perhaps generally desirable
mechanism for deterring insider trading.
A second problem considered in both Schein21 0 and Diamond211 was the
200. See supra discussion of Schein in text accompanying notes 95-98.
201. See supra discussion of Freeman in text accompanying notes 99-112.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 181-99.
203. See supra note 97.
204. In re Orfa Sees. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 (D.N.J. 1987).
205. Since Weinberger, the courts in Delaware have complete flexibility to consider "all factors" in arriving at the
proper amount of damages or some other remedy appropriate to the breach of fiduciary duty involved. Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
206. See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 502 (Del. 1981).
207. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
208. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court found the Trans Union
shareholders entitled to damages "to the extent that the fair value of Trans Union exceeds [the cash-out price of] $55 per
share." Id. at 893. Testimony by the plaintiff's financial experts valued Trans Union's shares from $65-$70 per share.
Although remanded to the Chancery Court (if the shares were found to be worth $60 per share, the recovery would amount
to approximately $65 million), the case was settled out of court for $23.5 million. Only $10 million was covered by the
directors' liability insurance; the rest was paid by the purchasing group (although they were not legally obliged to do so).
See Schatz, Focus on Corporate Boards: Directors Feel the Legal Heat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
209. Note, The Availability of Variant State Remediesfor Pendent State Fraud ClaimsActionable Under the Federal
Securities Acts, 47 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1213, 1216-18 (1974). Punitive damages are not an option in the case of a rule lOb-5
case. T. HAzEN, THE LAw oF SEcutrms RGuLATioN 741 (1985). See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages
in Securities Cases, 52 U. Cm. L. Rav. 611 (1985); Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A
Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984).
210. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1973).
211. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 504, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915-16, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 86 (1969).
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possibility that an insider trader, if liable under the Diamond approach, could
theoretically be subject to double or even triple liability for the same conduct. Double
liability could result in the event that the corporation recovered under the Diamond
approach and defrauded purchasers were successful in recovering under rule lOb-5.
In certain cases, it is also conceivable that the corporation could recover short-swing
profits under section 16(b).212 Once again, the "problem" can be managed in a
number of ways. In light of the fact that the purpose of both the federal and state law
remedies is to deter insider trading, the simplest and most desirable approach would
be to recognize that insider trading involves the "possibility of two distinct harms
here, one to the corporation and one to the shareholders" 213 that are both deserving
of a remedy. 214 While other solutions exist,215 among them the possibility of the
corporation's holding the profits in escrow for the benefit of any successful defrauded
traders, 216 they are less desirable. The right of the corporation is not necessarily less
worthy than the rights of individual investors. Finally, there is little question that the
threat of losing only the profits that an insider trader unlawfully gained is in fact no
deterrence at all. An ideal correction for that problem would be the threat of liability
for two or even three times the amount of the unlawful profits. 217
Finally, some have argued that since the states will vary in deciding whether and
to what extent to adopt the Diamond approach, the differences in the state common
law will preclude uniformity in actions brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 2 18
That problem, however, is unrelated to whether the Diamond approach is necessary
or desirable. It was created by the United States Supreme Court when it chose to inject
the common law into the federal remedy. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recently
held that the Constitution does not require uniform regulation or endorsement of
uniform theories of regulation;219 and that ruling was in the context of upholding a state
anti-takeover statute, one in fact at least arguably inconsistent with, if not actually
212. See supra note 22.
213. The Orfa court took this approach. In re Orfa Secs. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1458 (D.N.J. 1987).
214. Id.
215. See generally Note, Common Law Corporate Recovery, supra note 65, at 289-94.
216. The approach was first suggested and used by the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301, 1307
(2d Cir. 1971).
217. Double damages is not such a novel idea. A number of federal statutes contain treble-damage provisions:
notably the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, title IX of which is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)). RICO serves
broad remedial purposes, providing for treble damages, and fraud in the sale of securities may provide one of the predicate
acts of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). For articles discussing the use of RICO in securities fraud cases, see
Johnson, Predators Rights: Multiple Remedies for Wall Street Sharks Under the Securities Laws and RICO, 10 J. CoRP.
L. 3 (1984); Wang, Recent Developments in the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market Inside Trading, 6 Coap. L. REv.
291 (1983); Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and Computation, 61 NoTRE DAME L. Rzv. 526
(1986); Note, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to Securities Violations, 8
J. Cotu. L. 411 (1983). Since 1970, 27 states have enacted mini-RICOs, 22 of which include the private multiple-damage
suit. Blakey, A Rebuttal to Some of the Myths Spurring Reform Effort in Congress, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 3, 1987, 26, 28 n.39.
Still another treble-damage federal statute pertinent to this Article is the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. See supra
note 2.
218. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 17, at 851-52.
219. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
contrary to, the federal regulation of tender offers. 220 This problem then, according
to the Supreme Court, is not a problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need for and the desirable aspects of the Diamond approach to the regulation
of insider trading clearly dwarf the minor shortcomings associated with its adoption,
endorsement, and expansion. The regulation of insider trading has been returned to
the state courts after a lengthy period of de facto federal preemption. Those courts'
enforcement decisions are critical, their particular competence and experience in
matters of fiduciary duty are axiomatic, and the usefulness of some state law
differences in the scope of regulation may well provide information helpful in the
future to lawmakers who will periodically reevaluate whether, how, and to what
extent insider trading should be the subject of federal or state law regulation.
Meanwhile, the effective deterrence of insider trading lies with the future of the
Diamond approach. Accordingly, its widespread expansion is likely to and should be
a part of the timely resurgence of state common law regulation of what many regard
as the insidious practice of insider trading.
220. Although the Indiana statute would delay some tender offers, the delay was not sufficient to allow preemption
by the Williams Act. Indiana's Control Share Act was no more of a delaying tactic for control than, for example, staggered
terms for directors or cumulative voting. Id. at 1649. "[S]tate regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities
whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law." Id. at 1649. Cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982) (Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute as a direct restraint on interstate commerce). See generally Pinto,
Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MtAw L. REy. 473 (1987);
Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of State Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 657
(1987).
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